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Abstract
Discussions about a replicability crisis in science have been driven by the normative
claim that all of science should be replicable and the empirical claim that most of it
isn’t. Recently, such crisis talk has been challenged by a new localism, which argues a)
that serious problems with replicability are not a general occurrence in science and b)
that replicability itself should not be treated as a universal standard. The goal of this
article is to introduce this emerging strand of the debate and to discuss some of its
implications and limitations. I will in particular highlight the issue of demarcation that
localist accounts have to address, i.e. the question of how we can distinguish replicable
science from disciplines where replicability does not apply.
Keywords Replication crisis .Replicability.New localism .Demarcation problem .Trust-
establishing practices
1 Introduction
The debate about replicability issues in the experimental sciences goes back many decades
(in particular in fields such as social psychology), but it has erupted with particular force
after 2011 with the publication of several key studies in both biomedicine and the
psychological sciences (Prinz et al. 2011; Simmons et al. 2011; Begley and Ellis 2012;
Pashler andWagenmakers 2012). Since then talk of a ‘crisis’ has rapidly accelerated (Fanelli
2018) and expanded to other fields (e.g. health informatics (Coiera et al. 2018) or artificial
intelligence research (Hutson 2018)). This expansion of the debate has been accompanied
by the frequent use of generalising terminology, with key commentators talking of ‘the’
replication crisis in science and proposing general measures to tackle it. Underlying this talk
of a crisis is not just empirical data on replication failures but also the fundamental
assumption that replicability represents a universal epistemic standard for science.
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Recently, however, this broad way of approaching the issue has come under
increased scrutiny. Based on empirical and conceptual analyses, several authors
have argued a) that issues with replicability are not a general problem in science
and b) that the ideal of replicability does not universally apply to all disciplines.
This new localism not only implies that significant problems are limited to
specific sub-fields, but also that high failure rates are not automatically a sign
of crisis. Both claims together raise important challenges for current debates
about the status quo of science and about the development of adequate policy
measures.
The goal of this paper is to analyse the growing literature on the new localism in the
replication crisis debate; to discuss its implications for the debate about science policy;
and to address open questions the new accounts still face.
In the first part of the paper, I will analyse the two claims that I see as
central to the new localism: the empirical claim a) (section 2), and the norma-
tive claim b) (section 3). I will argue that these claims are not only plausible
but also important, as they directly affect the debate about science policy. In
the second part of the paper, I will focus on a key question that the normative
claim has to address, namely, the question of demarcation: how can we identify
fields of science where replicability does not apply as an epistemic standard
and for which a high failure rate for replications might therefore be the norm? I
will show that most existing accounts draw this line using the living/non-living
distinction and argue that new findings from the postgenomic life sciences
suggest that this line is too narrow (section 4).
2 The reproducibility crisis in context
The replication crisis is often discussed in broad terms, with many commentators
presenting the problem as one of science in general and possible solutions as widely
applicable measures. Daniel Sarewitz, for instance, claims that:
“Science, […] our one source of objective knowledge, is in deep trouble [as] much
of this supposed knowledge is turning out to be contestable, unreliable, unusable, or
flat-out wrong” (Sarewitz 2016, p. 5).
Similarly, Roger Peng talks about ‘the’ crisis in science when he discusses how
better statistical training could improve science’s status quo (Peng 2015). Francis
Collins and Lawrence Tabak claim that “[r]eproducibility is potentially a problem in
all scientific disciplines” (Collins and Tabak 2014).
These worries about a crisis in science are based on the idea that replicability itself is
a universal standard for reliable science. Replicability is often called a “cornerstone of
science” (e.g., Simons 2014; eLife editorial 2017) and unbiased replication mecha-
nisms are seen as essential for “maintaining high levels of scientific credibility”
(Ioannidis 2012, p. 645). Without replications and replicability, so the idea, science
as a whole lacks trustworthiness and credibility.
But despite the pervasiveness of generalisations, the debate about replication in
science has also been characterised by an awareness of the importance of local
context. This localism was not always explicit, but it can, for instance, be seen in
the fact that whole fields, such as physics or chemistry, are usually excluded from
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the debate.1 As I will show in this and the next section, the emphasis on the
importance of the local research context has gained more urgency and support in
recent years. Here, I will first look at the empirical claim that there is no general
crisis in science and that replicability issues are likely a local problem. Before I do
so, however, I will also make a few remarks on the conceptual landscape of the
debate.
2.1 Understanding replicability
The debate about the replication crisis is complicated by the fact that there is still no
firm consensus on how exactly to define the terms used in the debate (Schmidt 2009;
Goodman et al. 2016; Nosek and Errington 2017). What is clear is that ‘replicability’
and ‘replication’ are related but different concepts: a replication is an actual attempt to
re-produce an earlier finding/experiment (or the outcome of such an attempt), whereas
‘replicability’ is a quality of an experiment/observation or a scientific finding.2 Impor-
tantly, replicability is often also turned into a norm, i.e. the assumption that a finding or
experiment should be replicable in order to be reliable.
This last point matters as it highlights two connected but different strands of the
debate: first, there is a general debate about the different forms that replication can take
on in research. This can be seen as a descriptive exercise, trying to capture the practices
researchers associate with the term ‘replication’. Second, there is a normative debate
about the forms of replication that scientists should adhere to. It is within this second
strand of the debate that the idea of a crisis has emerged.
Scientists and other commentators have identified a variety of replication types over
the years.3 Two types that have come to dominate the discussion are ‘direct’ and
‘conceptual’ replications. Both terms have received somewhat differing definitions
and there is in particular no consensus on what ‘direct’ means in the context of
replication. However, there are some key features that many authors seem to agree
on, namely 1) that in a direct replication the same experimental protocol should be
applied to the same kind of materials (for instance, individuals taken from the popu-
lation originally studied, or the antibodies or cell lines used in the original experiment)
and 2) that such an experiment should give an outcome that is the same or at least
similar to that originally obtained. ‘Similar’ here means that the measured effect size
could be smaller or bigger than the original, but that the direction of the effect should be
the same (for instance, ‘Overexpression of gene X accelerates cell growth’, or ‘Indi-
viduals presented with intervention X are more likely to do Y’). Findings and exper-
iments are seen as reliable and trustworthy if they can be replicated in this particular
manner.
A ‘conceptual’ replication, on the other hand, is often defined as an attempt to see an
effect in the same direction as that originally reported using a different experimental
protocol and/or materials. This type of replication is often linked by commentators to
1 But note that there have been discussions in chemistry regarding the extent to which the field could be
affected by the issue (Bergman and Danheiser 2016).
2 Note that some authors distinguish between ‘replications’ and ‘reproductions’ (or ‘replicability’ and
‘reproducibility’), whereas others – including the author of this paper – use the terms interchangeably.
3 See (Barba 2018; Fidler and Wilcox 2018; Plesser 2018) for analyses of this diverse and complex conceptual
landscape.
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the goal of generalizing a finding or of testing its robustness, rather than assessing its
reliability (Schmidt 2009). Some have suggested that such experiments should there-
fore be labelled as ‘extensions’ rather than ‘replications’ (Zwaan et al. 2018).
Apart from these two forms of replications there is a wide variety of further
meanings associated with the term ‘replication’. Leonelli (2018), for instance, describes
‘scoping reproducibility’, which consists of re-running experiments in order to identify
potential sources of variation in experimental outcomes. Whilst this and other practices
will form part of the experimental repertoire, this does not mean that they are also
elevated to the level of a general epistemic norm. If researchers fail to identify the
factors that cause variation in an outcome, this is unlikely to trigger talk of a funda-
mental crisis in science. The case is different, however, for the idea of direct replication.
What triggered and further fuelled the crisis narrative were reported failures to directly
reproduce existing results. And it is also this strict ideal of replicability that the new
localists have set their eyes on. When I therefore speak of the replicability norm, I refer
to this narrower understanding of replicability.
2.2 Understanding the actual extent of the problem
Following the emergence of the replication crisis narrative in 2011, several large-scale
replication studies have been set up to assess the actual extent of the problem in
different disciplines, ranging from the psychological sciences, to cancer research or
even experimental economics. These studies, however, have so far failed to produce a
clear picture of science’s status quo.4
The largest of these studies, the ‘Reproducibility Project: Psychology’ (RPP),
attempted to replicate 100 studies published in three psychology journals in the year
2008, an effort that resulted in a worryingly low success rate of only 39% (Open
Science Collaboration 2015). Other studies that also focused on the psychological
sciences painted a slightly more optimistic picture. The Many Labs project, which
analysed how differences in settings/samples affect the variation of experimental
outcomes, found success rates for replications between 50% (if a strict significance
criterion was applied) (Klein et al. 2018), and 77% (Klein et al. 2014). These studies,
however, used relatively small and non-random samples of studies (28 and 13, resp.)
and deliberately included findings that were known to be robust (Klein et al. 2018).
This could explain, in part at least, the higher success rates that were observed,
compared to the RPP.5
Preliminary results from an ongoing replication study in pre-clinical cancer research
(‘Reproducibility Project: Cancer Biology; (Errington et al. 2014)) also indicate a
higher success rate for replications than originally reported in this field (early studies
by (Begley and Ellis 2012) and (Prinz et al. 2011) reported surprisingly low success
rates for replications of 11% and 20-25%, resp.). Of the 14 replications completed as of
September 2019 two could not be interpreted. Of the remaining 12 studies, three failed
to reproduce the original experiments they intended to reproduce, resulting in a failure
4 Fanelli is more optimistic as he claims the findings are “either reassuring or inconclusive” (Fanelli 2018, p.
2629).
5 On the other hand, several authors argued that the findings of the RPP might be underestimating the actual
amount of replicable data in psychology. See (Fanelli 2018) for a discussion.
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rate of 25% (based on a total of 12 useable studies). Of the successful nine replications
five were qualified as a full success whereas four managed to reproduce some results,
but not others. Depending on how these mixed outcomes are interpreted, the success
rate for the ‘Reproducibility Project: Cancer Biology’ is currently between 42% and
75%. Again, the relatively low sample size somewhat limits the conclusions one can
draw from this study at this point in time.
Other fields appear to be doing marginally better than psychology (or cancer
research, if a strict success measure is applied to the above studies). A study on
experimental economics indicated a relatively high success rate for this particular field
of 61%–89%, depending on the success measure used (Camerer et al. 2016). A similar
study on the literature in social science found a success rate for replications of 62%
(Camerer et al. 2018).
Overall, these results give an inconclusive picture of the state science is in. For both
the social and behavioural sciences (Camerer et al. 2018), as well as pre-clinical cancer
research, the best estimate of the amount of replicable studies is somewhere between
35% and 75%. Given this relatively weak and vague empirical basis, it is difficult to
draw precise and definitive conclusions about the state of current research. At most,
what we can derive from the data we have is that some disciplines could be in trouble,
whereas other fields might not necessarily be in a significant crisis.
2.3 A local crisis?
To circumvent some of the above-mentioned problems researchers have relied on
alternative methods for assessing the extent and the distribution of replication issues
in science. Daniele Fanelli, for instance, uses metascience analyses, and in particular
data on the prevalence of the drivers of the crisis (or what are presumed to be drivers of
the crisis), as a proxy measure for replication issues.
One potential driver of the crisis that Fanelli and his co-workers looked at in more
detail is the prevalence of publishing and reporting biases. These biases are often seen
as potentially distorting the reliability and integrity of the scientific literature, because
they influence what is being published and what is not. One example is the concept of a
‘grey literature bias’, which postulates that studies with small effect sizes are difficult to
publish in traditional peer-reviewed journals and are therefore more likely to appear in
less accessible outlets, such as personal communications, PhD theses, or other so-called
‘grey literature’. This could mean that the scientific literature published in traditional
outlets is biased towards studies that report large effect sizes. If that is the case, then the
landscape of widely accessible findings would be significantly distorted.
Interestingly, Fanelli’s analysis of the literature in different disciplines showed that
whilst this and other publishing biases are present in science, they are not as prevalent
as it has been feared. Moreover, the analysis showed that they are not equally
pronounced in each field analysed (Fanelli et al. 2017). The same is the case for other
potential drivers of low replicability, such as the low statistical power of studies (Fanelli
2018).
Whilst Fanelli previously supported a general crisis narrative, he now argues, based
on his analysis of metascience data, that this narrative is at least partially misguided
(Fanelli 2018). Some sub-disciplines might be facing significant issues, but we are not
warranted to claim that whole disciplines or all of science are in crisis. As he puts it:
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“Recent evidence from metaresearch studies suggests that issues with research
integrity and reproducibility, while certainly important phenomena that need to be
addressed, are […] heterogeneously distributed across subfields in any given area,
which suggests that generalizations are unjustified” (ibid, 2628).
Fanelli stresses that the problem has to be thought of in a local rather than a
generalising manner. Based on this analysis, he argues that the negative narrative of
‘science-in-crisis’ should be replaced with a more positive narrative of challenges and
transformation. I will return to what his take on the replication crisis means for current
policy debates in section 3.2.
3 Replicability as a local standard
A similar claim about the importance of the local research context has recently been
made based on conceptual considerations rather than empirical analyses. This second
component of what I call the new localism in the replication crisis debate targets the
idea of replicability as a universal standard (de Rijcke and Penders 2018; Leonelli
2018; Nadin 2018; Penders et al. 2019).
The question of when replicability is a suitable epistemic norm is complex, but the
critics of the norm have identified three aspects of research practice that can serve as
guides for this debate: the type of questions researchers ask, the experimental setups
they use, and the nature of the objects they analyse.
3.1 Working with different questions and setups
The first reason why not all research might have use for the ideal of replicability is the
type of question it addresses. As de Rijcke and Penders (2018) point out, in the
humanities the goal is often not just to develop single factual statements, such as
‘Person X has created artwork Y’, but to generate insight into questions of meaning or
style. To answer such questions requires the researchers to take historical and social
context into account. This also means that there can be multiple valid answers to the
same question. Such plurality is often seen as an inherent feature of this type of
research, and not as a sign of immaturity or flawed research practice. When addressing
complex issues like, for instance, migration and what it means for society on a global
scale, diverse positions are needed to develop sensible solutions that can work (Penders
et al. 2019). This type of research cannot lead to ‘the’ single answer that scientists can
arrive at with a highly standardized protocol. To impose a strict replicability criterion
would therefore be counterproductive, as it would endanger the production of diverse
insights and hypotheses in these fields (de Rijcke and Penders 2018; Penders et al.
2019).
Besides the type of research questions asked it is also the research setup itself that
has to be factored in when assessing the suitability of the replicability criterion. Leonelli
(2018) distinguishes between six different research settings that are relevant for this
debate: 1) the validation and development of software in computer science, 2)
standardised experimentation, 3) semi-standardised experimentation, 4) non-standard
experimentation, 5) observational case studies, and 6) participant observation. The key
dimension of this typology is standardization and its related issue of control: depending
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on how much control each research setting allows the researcher to exert over key
variables, the replicability criterion is more or less suitable.
In Leonelli’s account, software development and participant observation represent
the extreme ends of a spectrum: in the case of computer science, researchers can exactly
control what is being used (existing data and code) and how a test is run. This means
they have a high level of control. Because of this control, the ideal of direct replicability
can be applied (and achieved in actual practice).
In the case of participant observation such tight control is not possible. There are too
many variables that the researcher cannot fully control (including the effects of her own
presence). As a result, each observer will encounter a highly idiosyncratic situation and
come away with their own experience, observations, and interpretation of the case.
Leonelli argues that the direct replicability of a finding is therefore not even expected
by researchers in such research settings.6
This, however, does not mean that participant observation is less trustworthy and/or
accountable. Because of their awareness of the importance of context, researchers
engaged in participant observation invest more resources into making sure that the
data they collect are carefully documented and preserved. The idea is to ensure
accountability. As Leonelli explains:
“In non-standard types of inquiry, researchers typically recognize that direct repro-
ducibility cannot function as an epistemic criterion for research quality, and instead
devote care and critical thinking on documenting data production processes, examining
the variation among their materials and environmental conditions, and strategizing
about data preservation and dissemination” (Leonelli 2018).
This goes as far as documenting the researcher’s personal circumstances during the
observation process. The idea is to enable readers of the report to judge how factors
such as the emotional state of the researcher might have affected the results and
interpretations that were reported. In line with this, Penders and colleagues have
highlighted that there are other ‘technologies of accountability’ – apart from replica-
tion – that researchers can use to ensure the production of reliable and trustworthy
findings (Penders et al. 2019). Similarly, Jim Bogen has pointed out, based on an in-
depth study of nineteenth century research in physiology, that replications might not
always be necessary to assess the reliability of existing evidence, as researchers have
other ways of doing so (Bogen 2001).7
Whilst the above arguments against replicability as a universal epistemic norm seem
convincing when applied to the observational sciences and the humanities, it is not
clear if and how this criticism extends to fields such as biology or chemistry, where
semi- and non-standardised setups abound. It is here that the third aspect highlighted
above, i.e. the nature of the object of interest, becomes a central factor in the debate.
Before I turn to this issue in section 4, I will first draw an initial summary of what the
new localism means for the debate about a replication crisis and science policy.
6 There are two different claims mixed into arguments for localism: on the one hand the authors make an
empirical claim, i.e. that researchers in particular fields don’t actually use replicability as a standard. On the
other hand, there is a normative claim that the standard should not be applied to certain fields.
7 This raises an important issue that any localist approach has to address, namely the question of the nature and
the importance of alternative ‘trust-establishing practices’ (TEPs), which might be used in areas where
replicability does not apply as a norm. I will return to this point in section 5.
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3.2 The implications of the new localism
A key claim of the new localism in the replication debate is that it does not make sense
to assume (or impose) replicability as a general epistemic criterion for the quality of
scientific findings; in some areas of research, such as observational research, the ideal
simply is not applicable (and not applied by researchers in actual practice).
This claim has important consequences for the debate about a crisis in science as it
shifts the goal posts: if we take the conceptual component of the new localism
seriously, then concrete numbers for failure rates might not mean much anymore. A
high failure rate for direct replications of, e.g., 80% could simply mean that the field is
working as it should. It might not be a sign of a crisis because the standard that guides
such a reading of these numbers does not apply in the first place. Once we factor in
localism, the focus is no longer just on the actual failure rates in each discipline or sub-
discipline, but on what these numbers might mean.
Some authors have gone further than this and claimed that failure in general is not a
sign of crisis but just part of normal science (see, e.g., Firestein 2015; Redish et al.
2018). Whilst these views share a rejection of general crisis talk with the new localism,
the latter represents a middle position in this often-heated debate, as its main point is
not to question crisis talk per se. Rather, what is questioned is the indiscriminate
expansion of the crisis narrative and the application of ‘replicability’ as a universal
epistemic norm.
Understanding the limits of replicability matters for current policy debates. A key
point of the new localism is that some fields should be kept out of the ongoing
replication drive (see also (Bissell 2013) for an early critique of the replication drive).
If, for instance, direct replicability is expected of all research then this could skew
funding decisions against specific parts of science that are by nature less standardized
(but not less important or accountable). A replication drive that is too broad could also
lead researchers to pursue research protocols that ignore the inherent variation of the
local context studied (Leonelli 2018). Furthermore, it might lead scientists to abandon
the disciplinary standards of their field and lead to a reduction in the diversity of the
findings and interpretations they produce (Penders et al. 2019).8
The conclusions we can draw from Fanelli’s empirical analysis are similar: if the
extent of the replication problem is not the same across science or even sub-disciplines,
then broad changes to how research is funded and regulated might not be justified,
especially as they could create harm in fields that don’t need correcting in the first
place. Furthermore, if intervention is required, the measures taken would have to be
sensitive to the local context and to the concrete problems it suffers from, as the drivers
of the problem are not always homogeneously distributed across science.
In sum, the focus on the importance of the local research context matters, because it
changes the debate about how we measure and talk about reliable and trustworthy
science; because it draws our attention to potentially negative side effects of the
replication drive; and because it highlights the importance of local measures to tackle
the problem.
8 Stuart Firestein makes a similar case when he discusses the importance of failure for science and the need for
a funding system that allows error-prone research to go ahead (Firestein 2015, ch. 12).
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4 Drawing the line
Whilst localism is a credible and promising approach to the replication crisis debate, it
is also an approach that raises new questions. One issue that stands out is that of
demarcation: if replicability is not a universal ideal, then where do we draw the line?
How can we know to which fields the norm applies and to which it doesn’t?
The discussion in section 3 has shown that there might be well-defined poles where
things are relatively straightforward – research in computer science at one end and
participant observation in fields like anthropology at the other. But once we enter the
realm of semi-standardised or non-standardised experiments, we encounter a large grey
zone where it becomes much harder to decide if replicability should apply or not. This
uncertainty matters because it directly affects debates about policy measures and about
how they should be designed.
In this section, I will have a closer look at how different authors address this issue. I
will show that the nature of the object of interest becomes crucial in this context. I will
also highlight some key issues this particular demarcation criterion faces.
4.1 The question of standardisation
When it comes to the suitability of the replicability ideal, we have seen that high
standardization and control over variables are crucial. Leonelli describes one class of
experiments (apart from work in computer science) that can achieve such levels,
namely what she calls ‘standardised experiments’. Examples of such experiments can
be found in the clinical sciences or in physics. In randomized controlled trials (RCTs),
for instance, researchers apply rigorous controls to ensure that results are as reliable as
possible. Leonelli argues that in such standardised experiments the idea of direct
replication can be applied and is expected by scientists in actual practice.
However, such high standardization and control can only be achieved in a select few
experimental contexts. In the majority of cases, especially in fields such as biology,
researchers are dealing with what Leonelli calls ‘semi-standardised’ or ‘non-
standardised’ experiments. The latter include, for instance, exploratory experiments
where researchers investigate new entities or phenomena on which they have little or no
background information. In these cases, standardization is not possible because the
researchers might not know what to expect or what to control for. Leonelli argues that
in such non-standardised settings the idea of direct replication (or conceptual replica-
tion for that matter) is ‘not helpful’ (Leonelli 2018, p. 10).
In the case of semi-standardised experiments there is also limited control that can be
exerted (even though standardisation is possible and actually implemented). The prob-
lem here is not the availability of information or materials but the nature of the objects of
interest. In particular, when working with living entities, such as model organisms,
researchers are unable to control each and every aspect of the intervention because the
objects of interest are highly context-sensitive (Leonelli 2018, p. 9). Animals, for
instance, are responsive to changes in lighting, nutrition, or even the gender of the
people handling them (Chesler et al. 2002; Lewejohann et al. 2006; Sorge et al. 2014).
Such context-sensitivity imposes constraints on the level of control that can be achieved.
Similar issues also affect experiments in psychology, where the human research subjects
can be influenced by the research setting and the interaction with other people.
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Leonelli does not make a normative statement when considering these grey zone
cases. She simply makes the empirical claim that many researchers who work with
semi- or non-standardized setups don’t aim for direct replicability. As I will show in the
following section, other authors who have commented on this issue argue that the
living/non-living distinction can and should be used as a demarcation line in this
debate.
4.2 Living entities and the problem of replicability
The idea that the nature of the entity of interest is crucial for any debate about
replication and replicability is not new. Schmidt (2009) begins his discussion of the
topic by highlighting that the idea of direct replicability builds on the fundamental
assumption of the uniformity of nature. This assumption, he claims, is problematic as
many fields deal with what he calls ‘irreversible units’ (ibid, p. 92). These are entities
that are complex and not time-invariant (Schmidt does not specify what ‘complex’
means in this context). A key feature of these entities is that they have a memory of
some sort; they ‘accumulate history’, as Schmidt puts it. In the case of human test
subjects this historicity means that they might remember – consciously or sub-
consciously – previous experiences and that this memory can affect their behaviour.
Testing the same entity at a later time point might therefore not produce the same
results, simply because the entity has transformed in key aspects. This historicity
creates a problem for the idea of direct replicability as it undermines uniformity.
Importantly, it goes beyond the context-sensitivity that Leonelli emphasises in her
discussion of animal model research (which focuses on present influences on the test
subject). Schmidt focuses his debate on the social sciences and only uses human test
subjects as an example. It is therefore not clear what other entities he would include in
his category of ‘irreversible units’.
Crandall and Sherman (2016) approach the issue in a similar way. They claim that
the idea of direct replication is a ‘sensible proposition’ in fields such as physics or
biology, where the processes that matter for the outcome of an experiment are trans-
historical and transcultural; changes in politics or language don’t change the weight of
an electron or the fold of a protein (Crandall and Sherman 2016).9 But in a field like
social psychology, a shift in language or socio-economic circumstances can profoundly
affect the behaviour of the entities studied (a blog post by Michael Ramscar provides an
in-depth analysis of how this might work (Ramscar 2015)). The entities studied in this
field change over time, and their internal makeup depends not only on the context they
are in but also the contexts they have experienced in the past. Crandall and Sherman not
only highlight the importance of memory and experience, but also the fact that cultural
factors, which shape a person’s behaviour, can change over time. Their account is also
more specific than Schmidt’s, as they seem to propose a sharp line between natural
sciences, such as physics or biology, and research in the social sciences.
Looking specifically at the humanities, de Rijcke and Penders (2018) follow a
similar approach to that of Crandall and Sherman when they talk of ‘interactive’ and
‘indifferent’ kinds. Humans are examples of the first kind, DNA molecules of the
9 Scholars in Science and Technology Studies, who have looked closely at the interconnections between
science and politics, might disagree with such a strong realism.
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second. Replicability, they argue, can only be used as a standard for the quality of data
when doing research on indifferent kinds. In the humanities, where interactive beings
are studied, this standard should not apply.
Whilst the above authors mainly focus on the role of historicity and plasticity in
psychology and the humanities, others have, like Leonelli, focused more specifically on
the situation in biology. Mihai Nadin, for instance, singles out biology because he
draws a sharp line between the realm of living entities and that of ‘dead matter’ (Nadin
2018). He argues that there are fundamental differences in how change and causality
work in these different realms, linking the idea of historicity and plasticity exclusively
to living entities. Of particular importance to his account is the idea that the space of
possibilities of living systems is continuously changing, an idea he takes from Giuseppe
Longo’s work (see, e.g., Longo 2017). He argues that:
“[T]he expectation of experiment reproducibility – legitimate in the decidable
domains of the non-living (physics, chemistry) – is a goal set in contradiction to the
nature of the change processes examined [in biology]” (Nadin 2018, p. 467).
Contrary to Crandall and Sherman (2016), he thus includes biology in the set of
disciplines that pose significant problems for reproducibility.
The special status of the entities biology studies is also emphasised by Maël
Montévil, who analyses the concept of ‘measurement’ in biology in the context of
the replication crisis (Montévil 2019). He points out that the behaviour of systems
analysed in physics is guided by an invariant underlying structure that can be captured
in mathematical terms. This invariance (and invariance-preserving transformations)
allows physicists to assume that generic conditions can be applied to generic objects
when they deal with their objects of interest. This also means that replicability can be
expected when particular features of physical systems are measured.
In biology, the situation is different. Here the organization of an entity depends on its
past and current contexts, meaning that history matters for the (living) object of analysis
(Montévil calls them ‘diachronic objects’ (ibid, p. 3)). Change also happens in physics
of course, but there it is based on an unchanging mathematical structure, which is
generic and therefore not context-sensitive (ibid, p. 5).10
The history-dependent nature of organisms also explains certain research practices in
biology, for instance why researchers often exchange cell lines or other living model
systems with each other (see also (Bissell 2013) on this point). The researchers have to
make sure that they work with materials which have had the same experiences, and
which are therefore more likely to display similar behaviours. The recent genealogy of
the specimen is a feature of biological systems that has to be controlled as tightly as
possible by the researcher to increase reliability (Montévil 2019, p. 10).
In summary, we see that a range of authors emphasise, in different ways, the
importance of historicity and plasticity for debates about replicability. They highlight
the fact that some types of entities are fundamentally time-dependent and that this
interferes with the idea of uniformity that underlies the replicability ideal. Some
authors, such as Nadin (2018) and Montévil (2019), link these features explicitly to
living systems, whereas others talk more generally of ‘irreversible’ or ‘interactive’
entities.
10 The importance of history for biological objects is also captured by Steven Rose’s notion of ‘lifelines’ (Rose
1997).
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Much of this debate implies that these distinctions should define a relatively clear
boundary between science that can be treated as replicable and disciplines to which the
replicability norm does not apply. The nature of the objects of interest affects the level
of standardization and control that is possible in a field. This, in turn, affects the level of
replicability that can be expected. However, as I will show in the next section, the
practice of animal model researchers suggests that this line is not as clear as it might
seem at first.
4.3 Rescuing replicability by abandoning standardization
The way in which researchers in animal model research deal with the problem of
plasticity and historicity shows that they don’t abandon the ideal of replicability when
standardization and control become problematic. Similarly to what the above authors
have emphasized, these scientists stress the importance of the history of the organism
and its plasticity. As Voelkl and Würbel put it:
“[T]he response of an organism to an experimental treatment (e.g., a drug or a
stressor) often depends not only on the properties of the treatment but also on the state
of the organism, which is as much the product of past and present environmental
influences as of the genetic architecture.” They go on to conclude that “we should
expect results to differ whenever an in vivo experiment is replicated” (Voelkl and
Würbel 2016).
Even though this sounds like these researchers are ready to abandon the ideal of
replicability, the opposite is the case: rather than turning their backs on replicability,
they abandon the idea of standardization. Instead of seeing control in the form of
uniform parameters as the solution (see, e.g., Festing 2004), some animal model
researchers now see standardization as part of the problem (Würbel 2000; Richter
2017). This led them to coin the term ‘standardization fallacy’, which is defined as “the
erroneous belief that reproducibility can be improved through ever more rigorous
standardization” (Voelkl and Würbel 2016).
This shift in thinking leads to intriguing methodological consequences: to increase
the reliability of their findings these researchers now introduce systematic
heterogenization in their experimental setups, for instance through the use of animals
with different genotypes, gender, or housing conditions. The idea is that the results of
the experiment should become less sensitive to variations in these parameters, as the
variation is already factored in.
Several studies using this approach showed that it can lead to a significant increase
in the reproducibility of specific results. Using different mice strains in the same cage,
for instance, led to a reduction of the variation in experimental outcomes (Walker et al.
2016). Varying environmental factors the animals are exposed to also had a positive
effect on replicability (Richter et al. 2009, 2010, 2011). Furthermore, simulations
suggested that multi-laboratory experiments, which automatically sample different
housing and handling conditions, could increase reproducibility from 50% to 80%
(Würbel 2017).
Whether this approach is applicable to other cases of semi-standardised research
remains to be seen. What it shows, though, is that we are unlikely to find a general
approach to the issue of control and replicability, as researchers will abandon the ideal
in some cases, and re-invent their own experimental approaches in others in order to
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stick to the ideal. When it comes to the grey zone of semi- and non-standardised
experiments, a case-by-case analysis that pays close attention to actual research practice
will therefore be more important than a single, general demarcation criterion. There is
no general ‘ought’ that can be imposed here, and the living/non-living distinction can
only serve as a rough guide for demarcation.
In the last section, I will turn my attention to a second issue this demarcation
criterion faces, namely that of scope. I will argue that plasticity and historicity, which
have been exclusively attributed to living systems, apply to other systems as well, in
particular to macromolecular complexes such as DNA or proteins.11 This extension
matters as it suggests that the problem of localism is relevant to more fields than
initially thought, extending beyond the realm of living things. The rise of post-genomic
approaches to biological research, and in particular the field of environmental epige-
netics, has had a huge role to play in this context.
4.4 Extending the lines
The shifts that were brought about by the postgenomic revolution over the last 10–
15 years had several effects on biological theory and practice. The one that matters
most for our discussion here is the shift in our understanding of historicity: some of the
dynamics that were exclusively ascribed to living systems are now seen as features of
other elements of biological systems as well.
This shift has been mainly due to methodological developments. New technologies,
such as microarrays or high-throughput sequencing, have allowed researchers to gain
new insights into the dynamics of the organism and into the importance of phenomena
such as symbiosis (Guttinger and Dupré 2016). This has led researchers to a new
understanding of the importance of context and history for the makeup of what were
previously seen as ‘mere’ molecular systems.
Especially macromolecular complexes such as genomes or proteins are no longer
seen as passive junks of matter. The genome, for instance, is now seen by some as a
‘reactive’ entity that is co-produced and maintained by a range of different processes
(Gilbert 2003; Stotz 2006; Keller 2014). The genome has a sort of memory of past
exposures (through epigenetic modifications of nucleotides or histone proteins) and its
structure and behaviour are therefore not only defined by its sequence and its present
context but also by past events; as some authors have argued, the genome has a lifespan
of its own (Lappé and Landecker 2015). Because of these empirical and theoretical
developments, fields such as molecular biology, genomics, or even biochemistry now
have to be considered as areas of science where the ideal of replicability might hit its
limits.
Interestingly, most of the accounts that I discussed in section 4.2 don’t leave room
for such an extension, as they insist on using the living/non-living distinction as a
demarcation criterion. Montévil (2019), for instance, explicitly excludes biochemistry
from the problems biological measurement faces. Nadin (2018) also seems to exclude
the physico-chemical realm of peptides and other molecules from the problems living
systems pose. Similarly, de Rijcke and Penders (2018) count DNA molecules as part of
11 The claim is not that these systems are living. The point is rather that they share those features of living
systems that affect experimental standardization and replicability.
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the class of ‘indifferent’ entities. In essence, anything molecular is excluded in these
accounts from the realm of plasticity and historicity.
What the recent developments in the postgenomic life sciences highlight is that these
lines might be too narrow and that important questions about historicity, plasticity,
standardization, and control also have to be asked in the molecular life sciences.
Overall, this means that the new localism in the replication crisis debate is even more
important than the authors discussed above claim, as it raises important questions for a
broader range of disciplines regarding their methodologies and the production of
reliable output. At the same time, the discussion in section 4.3 has shown that
historicity and plasticity always have to be assessed in the context of actual practice.
In themselves they are not a reason for scientists to shun the norm of replicability.
5 Conclusions
The goal of this article has been to introduce what I call the ‘new localism’ in the
replication crisis debate and to address some of the issues this approach faces, in
particular the question of demarcation. The new localism claims that issues with
replicability might be a local problem for specific sub-fields of science and that
replicability itself should not be treated as a universal epistemic norm. I have argued
that this is a plausible and important extension of the current debate about replication in
science.
Taking this new localism seriously opens the door to a more fine-grained and
balanced approach to the debate about a crisis in science. It cautions against the
implementation of broad new policy measures, as not all disciplines might need
correcting.
The question of how we should identify the fields to which the replicability
standard does or does not apply is not fully answered yet. We have seen that there
are (at least) three different aspects of scientific practice that can be used to answer
this question: the type of questions addressed, the setup used, and the nature of the
objects analysed. The discussion in section 4 of this paper, however, has shown that
there is still a significant grey zone of research practices where there might not be a
clear answer to this question, and where a case-by-case analysis might be the only
sensible way forward.
This grey zone importantly includes significant parts of biological research, which
has been at the centre of the crisis debate in recent years. The concepts of historicity and
plasticity have been identified as key factors that need to be considered in debates about
replicability in this field. I have argued that recent developments in the postgenomic life
sciences raise important questions about the scope of these concepts, implying that they
apply much more broadly than most authors currently assume.
This debate about plasticity and historicity incidentally also highlights important
new roles for philosophy of science in the debate about replicability. Philosophers
already contribute to the replication crisis debate through reflections about conceptual
and epistemic issues. But their insights into and contributions to complex ontological
debates might prove equally helpful. Over the last decade or so, the question of how to
define life, and of how to understand the plastic nature of biological systems, have been
a key focus of philosophy of biology. The diverse literature on these topics could,
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indirectly at least, make a crucial contribution to analyses of replicability in science,
now that the new localism is opening up a new field of debate.
Last but not least, the authors discussed here have also highlighted that there might
be more ‘technologies of accountability’, or what I referred to as ‘trust-establishing
practices’ (TEPs), that scientists depend on, not just in the observational but potentially
also in the experimental sciences. The new localism implies that the current framework
within which replication is discussed is too narrow, a point that Bogen (2001) also has
made forcefully. Understanding the landscape of TEPs is a further challenge any
localist account must face, apart from the demarcation question. It is these practices
that can be used to ensure accountability and reliability in the absence of strict
replicability. To develop a more nuanced discussion about replicability and trust in
science we therefore also have to expand our knowledge of TEPs and of how they are
used in scientific practice, an endeavour to which philosophy of science, and in
particular philosophy of experimentation, could make significant contributions.
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